Have you ever thought about the right to be publicly naked? Whether we want it or not, this issue has long been part of the fabric of the legal system, but only in a negative, prohibitive way. Now, we may take a look at this legal problem from the point of view of social sciences.
I recently came across an article published in Res Publica, a “journal of legal, moral and social philosophy focusing on normative analysis of theoretical, practical, and public issues”. The article “The Right to be Publicly Naked: A Defence of Nudism” by Bouke de Vries [1] seems to argue that when public nudity does not pose a health threat, legal restrictions on nudism are unjust. It is contended that the freedom to be publicly naked should be recognized as a distinct legal right. By a ‘right to be publicly naked’, it is meant a “legally protected liberty to be naked in a range of places, including public beaches, streets, squares, and forests”.
The author introduces the reader to the world of what he calls “current anti-nudist laws”. There are various offences under which nudism or public nudity might be circumscribed within modern liberal democratic societies. “These include, but are not limited to: indecent exposure, public indecency, sexual exhibition, disturbances to public order, and threats to public peace”. It is pointed out that these anti-nudist laws and regulations are actively implemented by the relevant state authorities. Using specific examples, the author argues that it “would be mistaken to see these laws and ordinances as relics of Victorian sensibilities” and concludes that “contemporary liberal democracies heavily circumscribe public nudity”, so that “there is little reason for believing that these restrictions are bound to be lifted eventually”.
In order to defend a ‘right to be publicly naked’, the author is trying to “identify the interests served by such a right” and demonstrate that these “are strong enough to merit legal protection”. Two substantial social benefits that arise from the freedom to be naked in public are singled out. First, it promotes individual well-being. This means not only that nudist activities have great recreational value, but also a positive impact of nudism on body image and on life satisfaction of those who practice it. Second, public nudity has expressive value. Besides being a constitutive element of various spiritual and religious worldviews, public nudity is frequently used as a means of protest against “social and political evils”.
When it comes to potential contributions to people’s well-being, the author adduces three kinds of evidence: “testimonial, abductive, and empirical”. He starts with “abundant testimonies that practising nudism can bring pleasures that are neither immoral nor pathological”. Then, it is argued that it would be “difficult to explain why so many individuals practice it and why some are even willing to do so at the risk of incurring legal and/or social sanctions”. “A third source of support for the link between nudism and well-being is provided by empirical studies of the last few decades” that have found that “exposure to (non-exhibitionist) public nudity” can have “positive effects on well-being by promoting people’s body image”.
As for freedom of expression, “nudists and non-nudists often have strong expressive interests in the liberty to be publicly naked”. The author mentions two of them. “One expressive interest is identity-related. For many nudists, the ability to appear naked in public is necessary for expressing their identity, and in so doing, maintaining a sense of personal integrity or wholeness”. “The other expressive interest in the freedom to be publicly naked is communicative. While the ability to express our identity-constituting commitments can matter independent from whether others recognise our identities, such recognition can be pertinent as well”. In particular, nudists and non-nudists are using public nudity as “a means of promoting their moral and political views” and for naked protests which are “often highly effective in attracting public attention”.
Completing the review of possible objections, the article suggests that a right to be publicly naked should be recognized as a distinct right, considering it inefficient to incorporate nudist freedoms into existing rights, or “simply” to “secure them by excluding non-sexual, non-exhibitionist public nudity from existing laws against public indecency, sexual exhibition, and public disorder”.
References
[1] de Vries, B. The Right to be Publicly Naked: A Defence of Nudism. Res Publica 25, 407–424 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-018-09406-z
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-018-09406-z